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INTRODUCTION

The process of making judgments and formulating convictions is a

vital function performed by all human beings.

Successful accomplishment

of such tasks usually involves the integration of interoceptive cues (i.e.

past experience, feeling states, etc.) with exteroceptive, or objective,
information.

Often, personal idiosyncracies determine the relative amount

of flexibility with which convictions or opinions are held, regardless of

contradictory information.
One factor which often differentiates maladjusted individuals from

normals is the inability of the former to correctly evaluate available

information when making judgments.

An immature or disturbed person,

for example, may demonstrate unwillingness to postpone decision making
until sufficient facts are established.

This tendency is referred to by

Frenkel- Brunswick (19^8) as "intolerance of ambiguity.

1 '

In some instances, as in the case of the schizophrenic, an inability

to tolerate ambiguous situations may result in delusional thought.

Accord-

ing to McReynolds et al. (19&0, unassimalable information is not only

intolerable for the schizophrenic, but "anxiety provoking."

The schizo-

phrenic alleviates this anxiety by developing "a system of false beliefs

which serves to reduce some of the intolerable inner tensions of the personality at the expense of reality distortion," (Jenkins, 1952).

For

example, a schizophrenic who observes two strangers involved in a serious

conversation may become anxious if he is unaware of the topic which seems
to have the others so concerned.

Unable to ignore this ambiguity, the

schizophrenic concludes that the strangers are talking about him, and is
thus relieved of much of his anxiety.

Indeed, Schwartz and Wolfe (1959)

2

have characterized schizophrenia as a "quest for certainty in unreality.

1 '

It has been noted that "paranoid psychotics experience great relief when

they first formulate their suspiciousness and anxiety in the form of organized delusions..." (Boszormenyi-Nagy & Framo, 1965).
This predisposition toward delusion formation, according; to McReynolds,

constitutes a "characteristic technique used by some individuals for
dealing with all kinds of ambiguous stimulus inputs."

In other words,

delusional schizophrenics demonstrate a deficiency in sampling information
from the psychological environment.

Delusional schizophrenics, moreover, often tend to adhere rigidly

conclusions once reached.

to

In other words, once they have made some judg-

ment about the nature of a stimulus, delusional schizophrenics seem to
remain quite inflexible in their decisions and are slow to alter them in
the face of additional pertinent information.

This could be interpreted

as a defense against the recognition of possible errors in their thinking,
a factor which could cast doubt upon other decisions, and prove even more

threatening than the original ambiguity.

Though contradictory theories

appear throughout the literature, it is generally agreed that "rigidity
is a nonadaptive behavior," and that schizophrenics are more rigid than

normals, (Adams, i960).

In 1937, Shakow and Rosenweig found paranoid

schizophrenics. to be more rigid than hebephrenics.

Since paranoia and de-

lusional systems are often closely related, it is not unreasonable to assume
that delusional schizophrenics would exhibit a greater degree of rigidity

than those not prone to delusions.

Factor analyses of the components of rigidity bring to light two
points particularly relevant to the present study.

According to the Elgin

3

Prognostic Scale, (Wittman, 19^1), one characteristic of the rigid indi-

vidual is that he is "stubborn and opinionated. . .refusing to alter his
accustomed ways.

11

This "rigid strength tends toward evolution of an

organized paranoid psychosis," (Jenkins, 1952).

Thurstone \19kk) also

investigated the factor components of rigidity and found the speed of
closure (which is closely related to intolerance of ambiguity) to be
one of these factors.

If one component of rigidity is related to pre-

mature closure, delusional schizophrenics might be expected to be more
rigid than other schizophrenics, as delusionals are also intolerant of
ambiguity.

Levitt (1953) also found experimentally positive correlations

between the acceptance of popular misconceptions, (which is a form of

cognitive and social rigidity), and intolerance of ambiguity.
In some of the studies of delusion formation (Draguns, 19&3;

McReynolds et al., 1964; Cashdan, 1966) this pattern of thinking has been
investigated with reference to structuring of ambiguous visual stimuli.
McReynolds presented delusional and non-delusional schizophrenics with the
McGill Closure Test, allowing them the opportunity to attempt an identification of the stimuli or not, as they desired.

His hypotheses that the

delusionals would attempt more identifications and guess correctly more
often were upheld, from which he concluded that delusional schizophrenics
have a stronger tendency to structure ambiguous stimuli than do non-delusional schizophrenics.
The Cashdan study sought to define this tendency further by trying to

determine whether delusional schizophrenics structure prematurely as well
as more frequently*

Cashdan employed a technique utilized by Draguns (1963)

which made use of drawings of common, easily identifiable objects, presented
in varying states of "blurredness" ranging from completely unrecognizable

to

clearly distinct.

Subjects were shown the figures, beginning with the

most blurred and becoming increasingly clearer with each presentation,

and asked to guess the identity of the object as soon as possible.

The

number of photographs presented before a subject attempted an identification was taken as a measure of the subject's intolerance of ambiguity.

That is, the later the subject guessed, the more tolerant of ambiguity
he was.

Contrary to prediction, Cashdan"s maximally and minimally delu-

sional schizophrenic subjects did not demonstrate significant differences
as regards premature structuring with the blurred photograph technique.

The results of the McReynolds and Cashdan studies, however, are not

necessarily contradictory.

The former author merely measured whether

delusional schizophrenics would guess more often than non-delusional
schizophrenics when given a choice to guess or not to guess.

The larger

number of correct identifications made by delusional schizophrenics is
of course dependent on the fact that the number of correct guesses ob-

tained could not exceed the number of guesses made altogether.
according to McReynolds

1

Actually,

figures, the proportion of correct guesses made

by each group was roughly equal.

Therefore, while delusional schizophren-

ics tend to structure ambiguous stimuli more frequently than non-delusional

schizophrenics, it cannot be said that they do so more correctly.

Thus,

Cashdan 1 s question of whether or not delusionals structure prematurely
more often than non- delusional* is a valid one.

In his study, all sutv

jects were required to guess, and the variable observed was how much infor-

mation needed to be sampled before a guess would be attempted.

The fact

1
that significant differences were not found in Cashdan s study may have

been partially due to the fact that all his subjects were, to a greater

5

or lesser extent, delusional.

The first part of the present investigation replicates Cashdan's

experiment in order to shed additional light on the connection between

premature structuring and delusion formation.

This is basically accom-

plished by including a group which is not currently delusional, although
the subjects have a history of delusions.

The other groups consist

of

clearly delusional and clearly non-delusional schizophrenics.
The second part of the experiment examines the question of rieridity
in adhering to a decision once it has been made.

In this study, the

measure used to assess the amount of rigidity associated with the subjects

1

decisions is the number of increasingly clearer presentations

of the test object necessary to produce a change in a subject's response,

after he has been forced to make an early guess regarding the object's
identity.
It is assumed that premature structuring and an associated rigidity

are most markedly present in actively delusional schizophrenics, and to
a lesser degree in schizophrenics who were at one time actively delusional

but who, at the time of testing, had not been exhibiting delusional-

thought patterns.

If this were the case,

it could be attributed to a once

habitual learning pattern, the residuals of which have been maintained
over an extended period of time.

Schizophrenics who had never demonstrated

marked delusions in their thought patterns would, under the above criteria,
be expected to perform most like normals.

That is, of the three types of

schisophrenics described, those who have never been delusional should be
least likely to structure prematurely or to rigidly maintain an opinion
once they have formulated it.

It is nevertheless predicted that non-

6

delusional patients still will demonstrate more intolerance of ambiguity
and rigid adherence than normals.

Taking all the above into account, the study's specific hypotheses
could be phrased in the following manner:
1.

vSchizophrenics will require significantly fewer presentations of the

stimulus pictures in order to attempt identification of the ambiguous
stimuli than will normals,
2.

(Ambiguity hypothesis # l)

Actively delusional schizophrenics will require the fewest number of

presentions in order to attempt identification of the experimental
stimuli, while previously delusional and non-delusional schizophrenics

will require proportionately increasing numbers of presentations.

Nor-

mals will require the largest number of presentations before attempting

identifications.
3.

(Ambiguity hypothesis

-

#2)

Schizophrenics will differ significantly from normals in the number

of additional stimuli presented before a change in their decision is

indicated.

(Rigidity hypothesis # 1)

Actively delusional schizophrenics will require the largest number of
additional presentations before they indicate a change in their decision,
while normals will require the least.

Previously delusional schizophrenics

will change their responses with fewer additional presentations than those
who are actively delusional, but will require more presentations than nondelusional schizophrenics.

(Rigidity hypothesis # 2)

)
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METHOD

Subjects

Three experimental groups of schizophrenics and one control group of
"long term

11

hospitalized patients with non-psychiatric diagnoses were in-

cluded in the study.

The three experimental groups consisted of l) schizo-

phrenics who were actively delusional at the time of testing (hereafter
referred to as "Delusionals"), 2) schizophrenics who had

a

documented his-

tory of active delusions during some period of their illness, but who were
not currently exhibiting delusions ("Past - delusionals"

f

and 3) schizo-

phrenics who had never been rioted to exhibit delusional thinking ("Non
delusionals" )•

-

These patients were drawn from the inpatient population

of the Northampton State Hospital.

All subjects were obtained on the

basis of availability and willingness to cooperate.

In the case of the

experimental subjects, diagnoses and delusional criteria were determined
from hospital records, and all categories of schizophrenia (eg. simple,
chronic undifferentiated, paranoid, etc.) were represented among the
groups, though not with equal frequency.

Delusions, when noted either

past or present, were usually of a fixed nature and included ideas of
persecution* grandiosity, or self- referent beliefs.

Control subjects were inpatients at the Western Massachusetts Hos-

pital and the Cooley Dickinson Hospital, and were selected on the basis of
where
relatively long term hospitalization (two consecutive weeks or more
available), and non-psychiatric diagnoses.

Tuberculosis, orthopedic

in this
problems, and other illnesses of long duration were included

category.

The element of long term hospitalization was considered desir-

,

8

able in order to partially control for the effects of extended institu-

tionalization in the experimental patients.
Each of the four groups consisted of 15 patients (10 males and
females), yielding a total of 60 subjects in all.

5

They ranged in age

from 17 to 67 and were matched as closely as possible on variables such
as age, IQ, amount of education, socioeconomic status, and amount of time

spent in the hospital.

Means and standard deviations of age, verbal IQ

equivalent, and number of years of education were computed for each

group and are presented in Table I.

No significant differences were

found in these factors, either between groups, or between the experimental group as a whole (i.e. all schizophrenics) and the control group.
Duration of current hospital stay was a more difficult factor to match
and because of the vast ranges within groups, median lengths of hospital-

ization were calculated.

Median numbers of months in the hospital as well

as ranges for each group are also shown in Table I.

Even though the exper-

imental groups had on the average been in the hospital for a considerably

longer period of time than the control group, this difference did not seem
to affect the experimental measures.

104

Pearson r coefficients of .0^8 and

between the number of months in the hospital during the current

admission and the two experimental measures corroborated this assumption.
Subjects were excluded from the experiment when organicity was diag-

nosed or suspected, or

iji

cases of verbal IQ's below 80.

Since the exper-

imental tasks were visual ones, subjects needing eyeglasses were required
to wear them.

Materials

The ambiguous stimuli used in the experiment consisted of nine line

"
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drawings of common objects such as a dog, trees, a telephone, etc.

Each

drawing was sequentially blurred out of focus photographically until
nine
sets of 12 slides were obtained.

These ranged from perfectly focused

depictions of the object to unrecognizable representations.
1966, for a more detailed description of the stimuli).

(Cf m Cashdan,

The first slide

(#1) of each series was the most blurred, and #12, the clearest.

were projected on a 4' x

5*

Slides

ground glass screen in semi-darkened rooms,

with the subject viewing from a comfortable chair about seven feet from
the screen.

Procedure

Each subject was administered the Information subtest of the WAIS
to determine his approximate verbal IQ level.
Task A ,

This part of the study was concerned with the factor of

premature structuring.

The following directions were read to each sub-

jects
"I am going to project a series of slides on the screen for
10 seconds each. At first the picture will be very blurred,
but it will get clearer as we go along. As soon as you feel
you have any idea of what the picture is, tell me. Then we
will repeat the procedure with the next picture. Do you have
any questions?

To avoid confusion, and because the objects were essentially unrecogniz-

able for the first few presentations, the experimenter introduced the

presentation of the second slide in series #1 with the comment, "This is
the same picture, only a little clearer ."

When the subject made an identification, both the identification and
the number of the slide were recorded, and the first slide of the next

series was presented with the introduction, "This is the next set,"

This
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procedure was followed for the first eight sets of slides.
TaskJ3.

The second part of the study was concerned with the char-

acteristic of rigidity in adhering to a decision.

In order to investigate

this phenomenon, the ninth series was introduced by the following instructions:

"This last one is something different. At a certain point, I'm
going to ask you to guess. I know it will be very difficult,
but please try."
(In certain cases, when a subject had been consistently making identifi-

cations at the first presentation, .the last sentence of the instructions

was modified to read, "So please wait until

I

ask you to guess."

This

was done so that forced guesses would be made at the same time for all
subjects).

After the above instructions were read, slide #1 of series 9 was
presented for the usual ten seconds.

Then slide #2 was shown, and after

five seconds of exposure, the examiner asked, "Now, what do you think it
is?"

Subjects were encouraged to attempt the identification, if necessary,

or told that uncertainty should not deter them from guessing.

One subject

in each of two experimental groups refused to guess at this point, and

were excluded from analysis on Task B, but all other subjects did attempt
an identification when requested on the second slide.

After a guess had

been made, the identification was recorded, and the subject was read the
second part of the instructions:

"Now I will show you the rest of the slides of this picture.
They will get sharper as I go on, so you may feel you would
like to change your guess. If you no longer feel that this
(here name of object guessed by
is a picture of
subject was repeated), let me know right away."

__ ___
t

•

11

As soon as the subject indicated that he no longer felt the object
to be what he originally guessed it to be t the number of the slide was

recorded and the task was completed.

This procedure was followed regard-

less of whether or not the subject offered an alternative guess

Subjects were given no feedback except to be told that their perfor-

mance was satisfactory.

Care was taken not to allow patients to see

clearer slides of an object which they had already identified.

These

precautions were taken in order to prevent discouragement over incorrect
identif ications, and to avoid prejudicing subjects against making early

identifications if this happened to be their inclination.
identification was not a factor in this study.

Accuracy of

Only the amount of infor-

mation sampled before identification in Task A f and spontaneous change in
Task B f were investigated.

12

RESULTS
Task A

The mean recognition level scores (point at which the subject

attempted an identification) are presented with their standard deviations
in Table II.

Since the distribution of group scores showed considerable

deviation from normal distribution curves, non-parametric tests were used
to determine differences between means.

Wilcoxon f s Composite Rank Test

was employed for tests between individual groups, while the Mann- Whitney

U Test, designed for groups with unequal N's, was used to compare the
entire schizophrenic group with the normal controls.

As the table indicates, the Delusionals made identifications at a

significantly earlier point than any other group.

Though the difference

between the schizophrenic group as a whole and the normal controls was
not significant, the Mann-Whitney z score of 1.86 closely approaches

significance (.10>p;> .05), and is in the direction predicted by Hypothesis
1.

No differences were found between other individual groups, but the

direction of the score increments was as predicted by Hypothesis. 2.

Task B

Table III represents the mean rigidity scores and their standard

deviations for all groups.

Rigidity scores were taken as the number of

additional slide presentations necessary to bring about a spontaneous

alteration

of the forced identifications made on slide 2, series 9.

Thus,

lower scores indicate less rigidity in adhering to the decision originally
made, while higher scores show greater rigidity.

13

Here again, distributions were markedly skewed, and the Median Test

was used for intergroup comparisons.

On the whole, the schizophrenics

demonstrated significantly more rigidity in adhering to their original
forced guesses than did the Normals,

Also, both the Past-delusionals and

the Non-delusionals had significantly higher rigidity scores than the

Normals.

However, no significant differences were found among separate

schizophrenic groups.

Thus, Hypothesis 3 was confirmed by the

data, but

only the relative position of the control group as the least rigid was

upheld in Hypothesis

14

CONCLUSIONS

Task A

The results indicate that delusional schizophrenics tend to structure

ambiguous stimuli faster than do normals.

If the mean score obtained by

normals is taken to represent the optimal point for decision making, then

delusional subjects can be said to structure prematurely, not sampling
sufficient information before reaching a conclusion.

However, there was

no significant difference obtained between the total schizophrenic group

and Normals.

Even though significant differences were not found between

the remaining two schizophrenic groups, the differences obtained were in
the direction predicted, indicating that the tendency to structure pre-

maturely may be related to history of delusional thinking in a manner
approximating a continuum.

In other words, as Hypothesis 2 predicted,

actively delusional schizophrenics are most inclined to structure prematurely, while some vestiges of this tendency may remain in schizophrenics

who at one time did exhibit active delusions, though no longer do so.
The fact that schizophrenics with no history of delusions whatsoever ob-

tained almost the same mean score as normals lends credence to the belief
that premature structuring is related more directly to the phenomenon of

delusion formation than to schizophrenia itself.

It is likely that the

trend toward significance in the comparison between the combined schizo-

phrenic group and Normals is in part attributable to the fact that the
group is weighted 2:1 in favor of patients with records of delusional

thinking at some period in their illness.

Another factor is that pre-

mature structuring could be considered a maladaptive behavior, and would

15

therefore be more likely to appear in schizophrenics than in normals.
There is a possibility of course that within any group of past-delu-

sional patients there are individuals who are still experiencing delusional

thought patterns, but who have simply decided (or learned) that expression
of these ideas only results in negative reinforcement from individuals

in authority.

It is pertinent to point out here, however, the statisti-

cally significant difference between active delusionals and past delusionals as regards premature structuring of ambiguous stimuli.

If the assump-

tion regarding expression of delusions is valid, it would only indicate

that premature structuring is related in some way to the peculiar set of

psychodynamics which results in an individual overtly demonstrating his
delusions rather than keeping them exclusively to himself.

Since this

mechanism of verbalizing delusions would be found always and only in those
patients noted to be "actively delusional," the relationship between premature structuring and active delusions would still hold.

Task B

As predicted in Hypothesis 3# schizophrenics as a group tend to adhere more rigidly to a decision than do normals once they have committed

themselves to a particular stand.

If schizophrenia is considered a result

(or cause) of psychological stress, the above results uphold previous

findings (Smock, 1955; Moffitt and Stagner, 1956; Adams, I960) which correlate stress with rigidity.

In general, then, it can be concluded that an

individual experiencing an emotional disturbance such as schizophrenia

would adhere more rigidly to doubtful beliefs or decisions than would a
normal individual.

16

Since normals seem able to do without this defensive method of coping

with the environment, rigidity can safely be considered somewhat maladjusted as an adaptive mechanism.

It would seem logical, then, to assume,

as in Hypothesis k 9 that this rigidity factor would tend to increase as

individuals become more seriously disturbed.

If active delusion form-

ation is considered a sign of severe psychological disturbance, then the

prediction that delusional schizophrenics would demonstrate more rigidity
than schizophrenics without this degree of disturbance, should be demonstrable.
As the data show, however, just the opposite occurs.

No significant

difference was found between Delusionals and Normals, nor were significant
intergroup differences noted.

According to the data, the supposedly better

adjusted Past - delusionals showed more rigidity than normals.

The Non-

delusionals - assumed to be the most well adjusted of the schizophrenic
groups - were even more rigid than the Past-delusionals, though not signi-

ficantly so.
than .02.

Both groups differed from Normals with a probablity of less

Thus, Adams

1

observation (i960) that "some schizophrenics are

much more rigid than others," apparently applies to those not currently
exhibiting delusional thinking.

Perhaps the best way to interpret these seemingly inconsistent
findings is not to look at rigidity solely as a maladaptive copiner mechanism.

Rather, it might be more appropriate to view it simply as a low

level adaptive technique, one which requires a certain amount of stability
to employ, as do most adaptive techniques.

Boverman (1959) maintains

that although the schizophrenic appears rigid, he also suffers from a lack
of rigidity.

If he is not completely isolated in his thought processes,

17

such things as gullibility and lability can create problems for him.
The most disturbed schizophrenic, then,

!i

suffers not from rigidity, but

from a lack of ability to establish and maintain a strong sense of identity to which he uncompromisingly adheres."

Fisher and Fisher (1950)

obtained results which seem to support this position.

In general, they

found that schizophrenics who rely heavily on the defense mechanism of

rigidity and

"

1

self-sealing off boundaries

1

for personality protection

seem to be clinically less disorganized than others in their respective

diagnostic groups."

They conclude from their investigation that a tend-

ency toward an "isolating rigidity has a high protective value for seriously disturbed personality structures."
Normals, of course, do not need to make as much use of rigidity as
a coping mechanism, since they have more effective psychological resources

at their command.

However, it must be pointed out that the entire concept

of rigidity is a complex one, and still poorly defined.

Its profitable

use in future studies requires a more precise definition of rigidity,
particularly whether it is being viewed simply as a maladaptive technique
or as a defective but nevertheless adaptive mechanism.
In light of the findings in the present study, rigidity, as defined

here, tends to be associated with a remission or lack of delusion formation,
in what may be considered to be less maladjusted schizophrenics, i.e.,

Past-delusionals and Non-delusionals.

Since no significant intergroup

differences were found among schizophrenics on the basis of the rigidity
trait, a distinct continuum cannot be assumed to exist between presence

and total absence of delusions and amount of rigidity. demonstrated.
does appear, however, to be an inverse relationship between the two

There

18

mechanisms.
t

Taking into consideration the overall evidence, it seems reasonable
to suggest that the unique combination of premature structuring and lack

of effective use of the rigidity "coping mechanism In the schizophrenic,
1

bears a strong relationship to the formation (or expression) of delusions.

Since the direction of the trend seems to indicate a definite

pattern, further study with larger groups might be beneficial.

If de-

lusional,, schizophrenics could be subdivided on the basis of the extent

and complexity of their delusional systems, as well as the length of
time for which they have held beliefs, the exact nature of the relation-

ship between premature structuring, rigidity, and delusion formation
mig;ht be

formulated more clearly.

19

SUMMARY

In this study, the formation of delusions by schizophrenics was

investigated in relation to the tolerance of ambiguity and rigidity in
modifying conclusions.

Schizophrenics were grouped according to the

presence or absence of delusions during the course of their illness, and
compared with hospitalized normals.
subjects.

Two tasks were administered to all

Task A required identification of an ambiguous stimulus, and

Task B allowed for spontaneous modification of a premature, forced identification.

The entire schizophrenic group differed from normals on Task

A and significantly so on Task B #

Delusional schizophrenics were found to

be significantly faster in attempting identification of ambiguous stimuli
than either normals, schizophrenics with a past history of delusions, or
non- delusional schizophrenics.

Direction of intergroup differences were

found to be opposite to those predicted for Task B regarding the relative
amount of rigidity within the schizophrenic group.

Results were inter-

preted in terms of a unique combination of a tendency toward premature
closure (intolerance of ambiguity) and relative lack of rigidity as an

important factor in the formation and expression of delusional thought
patterns.
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TABLE II

Group

Standard
Deviation

Mean

*

Delusional

2.5

1.15'

Past-delusionals

5.5

3.56

Non-delusionals

6.4

3.23

Combined

**

uSchizophrenics

Normal controls

3.3

6.5

2.8

Task A - Tolerance for ambiguity. Scores represent point at which ident
(* p«C .01 for differences between Delusionals
ification was attempted.
.05 for difference from Normals)
and other groups; ** .10
p

> >
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TABLE III

Standard
« u
i.

«-*|-'

Delusionals

Past-delusionals

Mai r\

uq v j_a oion

5.0

3.26

6.0

3.72
***

Non-delusionals

3.26

Combined
Schizophrenics

5.8

3.39

Normal controls

3.3

1.05

Task B - Rigidity* Scores represent number of additional slide presentations necessary to produce spontaneous change in identification.
(*** p<C .02 for difference from Normals)

,
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